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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

THE WESTERN PACIFIC RAILROAD CO., a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No.

vs.

7399

WASATCH CHEMICAL CO., a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent takes exception to the statement of facts
eppearing in Appellant's Brief. While the so-called
''nature of action'' on page 2 thereof constitutes a concise statement of the case, the Statement of Facts is
not supported in any manner by the record and, so far
as appears therefrom, is a product of counsel's imagination.
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Plaintiff is a railroad operating as a common carrier between points in California and Utah. As stipulated by the parties, (Tr. 46) on or about the dates indicated in Exhibit "A" attached to and made a part of
Plaintiff's Complaint, there were shipped over Plaintiff's
lines from San Jose, California to Defendant at Salt
Lake City the commodity in question. Defendant received the items and paid Plaintiff the amounts shown
on said Exhibit "A" under the column captioned
''Amount Paid.'' Plaintiff claims that under the provisions of the applicable tariffs, the proper charge was
that shown on said Exhibit "A" under the column
"Tariff Charges" and brought this action for the difference between the two amounts, being the amount
shown as "Balance Due" on Exhibit "A," plus the applicable federal tax on the transportation of property
shown under the caption ''Tax.''
The only item shipped in each instance as an "Automatic Spray Dip'' manufactured by the Livestock
Sprayer Manufacturing Company of San Jose, California, as portrayed in Plaintiff's Exhibits "A" and
"B," and Defendant's Exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 4 and described as "a combination of a motor, a pump, a storage
tank, a filtering device, spray nozzles and an enclosure
or device for holding or restraining cattle while being
sprayed with D.D. T. or other new and modern insecticides, mounted on two wheels and an axle with a draw
bar and stand equipment." ('Tr. 28). The only issue
before the trial court was, under the applicable tariff
published by Plaintiff Railroad (Exhibit "C"), what
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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was the proper rate required to have been paid to Plaint~ff by Defendant· pursuant to the Interstate Commerce
Act' The trial court found the issue of law in favor
of Plaintiff and held that the article transported by
Plaintiff and delivered to Defendant is properly classified as a livestock spraying pen or chute, wood and steel
combined, Item No. 16937 of Western Classification No.
72 contained in Consolidated Freight Classification No.
17, and sprayers N.O.I.B.N. with engines, Item No.
41017 of said classification, a combination article, set up,
to which under the provisions of Rule 18 of said Consolidated Freight Classification No. 17 a first class rate
is applicable. The trial court thereupon entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant for
the amount prayed, together with costs of court.
ARGUMENT

I.
THE REASONABLENESS OF THE RATE
FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT TO BE APPLICABLE IS NOT IN ISSUE BEFORE THIS COURT.
A. Appellant has assigned as error ''The trial
court erred in failing and refusing to submit to a jury
the issue of reasonableness of the classification'' and
argues that the classification applied by Respondent
and sustained by the trial court was unreasonable. It
is generally held that a shipper cannot maintain an act:on in either a state or a federal court to obtain relief
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from an alleged unreasonable freight rate exacted or
proposed to be exacted from him for an interstate shipment where the rates so challenged have been filed and
published by the carrier pursuant to law and have not
been found to be unreasonable by the Interstate Commerce Commission. He must, under the Interstate Comnterce Act, primarily invoke redress from the Interstate
Commerce Commission, which body alone is vested with
power to entertain original proceedings for the alteration of an established schedule upon the ground that the
rates fixed therein are unreasonable. (9 Am. Jur., Carders, Section 180.) See
Baldwin v. Soott County Milling Co. (1939), 307 U.S.
478, 83 L. Ed. 1409.

where the court held:
"In the absence of prior finding by the Commission that the tariff charges collected for interstate transportation are unreasonable. there
can be no enforceable claim for damages caused
by exactions according to the tariff.''
There is nothing in the record which indicates that Appellant has ever had resort to the Interstate Commerce
Commission to determine whether or not the rate and
classification applied by Respondent is reasonable or
that the Commission has ever so found. Until Appellant
can show that it has exhausted its administrative remedy
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in this regard, it has no standing to raise the issue of
reasonableness.
It is well settled that in a court proceeding for an
under-charge, the question of the unreasonableness or
lmlawfulne3s of a rate, charge or classification is not
open. The only question is that of tariff application, regardless of the inherent lawfulness or unlawfulness of
the resultant charges. See, for example,

Davis v. Portlarnd Seed Company, 264 U. S. 403, 63
La·w Ed. 762 (1924).
where the tariff provision involved was in violation of
Section Four of the Interstate Commerce Act and yet
the court refused to give relief to the .shipper, saying:
"The Statute requires rigid observance of the
tariff, without regard to the inherent lawfulness
of the rates specified." (Page 425)
It is well settled that the question of reasonableness is
not open to the court but only to the Interstate Commerce
Commission. See

Great Northern Railway Oo. v. Merchants' Elevator
Co., 259 U.S. 285, 66 Law Ed. 943 (1922).
and

Crancer v. Lowden, 315 U.S. 631, 86 Law Ed.; 1077
(1942).
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In the last named case, in a suit for under-charges, the
court said:
''The issue of the reasonableness of the rates
was not open to the District Court. The meaning
of the tariff had been determined by the Commission. It remained to the railroad only to collect the rates for which the tariff called and for
the District Court only to see that the railroad did
collect them.'' (Page 635).
B. Unreasonableness of the rate as a defense would
be in the nature of a counterclaim for damages and not
only must first be raised before the Interstate Commerce
Commission but must also be pleaded as such. Not only
i~ there nothing in the record to indicate that Appellant
raised the issue of reasonableness before the Interstate
Commerce Commission but there is also nothing to indicate that Appellant raised the issue of reasonableness
in the court below. There is no reference in the pleadings
or elsewhere in the record claiming that the rate asserted
to be due by Plaintiff was unreasonable. The first and
only reference appears in Appellant's brief. It is elenlentary that issues not raised by pleading or not presented to or passed upon by the trial court will not be
reviewed by the Supreme Court on appeal.

Woolf v. G'flay, 48 Utah 239, 158 Pac. 788 (1916)
Utah Assets v. Dooley Bros. Assn.-(1937) 92 Utah
577, 70 Pac. 2d. 738.
Bucher v. Equitable Life Assu~'flance Sqciety-(1937)
91 Utah 179, 63 Pac. 2d. 604.
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II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Appellant apparently presents three arguments that
the decision of the trial court was an erroneous interpretation of the tariff: (1) that the article .shipped is a
spraying machine and therefore is within the classification of sprayers N.O.I.B.N., Item No. 15380 of Commodity Tariff 260-A, or (2) that the article shipped is
a combination of a sprayer and a vat, or (3) that the
article is a combination of a sprayer and a de-horning
chute (Item No. 16665 Consolidated Freight Classification No. 17) or a combination of a sprayer and a .stall
(Item No. 16955 Consolidated Freight Classification No.
17).
A. THE ARTICLE SHIPPED IS NOT A COMBINATION
OF A SPRAYER AND A STALL OR A SPRAYER AND A
DE-HORNING CHUTE.

The latter two arguments presented by Appellant
r.ssume that the Respondent's contention that the SprayDip is a combination article is correct and take issue only
with the description of the articles of which it is a combination.
Certainly, if the machine is a combination of a sprayer
and a pen or chute, the pen or chute would be a spraying
r,en or chute and not a de-horning chute. There is no
evidence or contention that the device is designed or used
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other than to hold cattle while being sprayed. Certainly
nothing is shown that it is a device to hold the animal for
de-horning. In fact, the manufacturer expressly testified that it could not be so used:
''The only way he could get to an animal in
this machine of ours would be to get inside.
Surely nobody would be fooli.sh enough to get inside with a bull to castrate or de-horn or brand
him. This machine can't possibly be used for anything except the thing we have designed it and
built it for. We wish it could. We wish we could
sell it for other purpo~es. There would be more
sales. But I can't think of anything other in the
world than what we sell it for, the spraying of
cattle." (Tr. 61).
Nor would the stall classification (No. 16955) apply.
A ''stall'' is defined in Webster's New I nte.rnational Dlic-

tionary, Second Edition, 1946, as:
''A place where horses or cattle are kept; a
.stable, a manger; esp. the compartment or division of a stable for one horse, ox or the like.''
''Pen'' is defined in the same dictionary as:
''A small enclosure for animals; any small
place of confinement.''
''Chute'' is defined in the same dictionary as :
'' Agric., a narrow high walled passageway
or similar device for holding or restraining animals, esp. cattle, as for branding or de-horning."
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Certainly the description, spraying pen or chute, (Item
1.6937, Consolidated Freight Classification No. 17) is
a more accurate and complete description of the portion
of the Spray-Dip, designed to restrain or confine the
animal while it is being .sprayed than to describe it as
a place "\vhere horses or cattle are kept. A stall is generally regarded as a more permanent place for keeping
the animal, as in a stable. Then too, the descriptive participle ''spraying'' makes the application of Item 16'937
rnore exact. It is also significant that the stall item appears in the original Consolidated Freight Classification
K o. 17, but that the more particular item, spraying pen
or chute ( 16937) did not appear until the issuance of
Supplement No. 8 to Consolidated Freight Classification
No. 17. Both items 16665 and 16955 are K. D. (knocked
down) items. The Spray-Dip was shipped set-up. (S. U.).
B. THE SPRAY-DIP IS NOT A COMBINATION OF A
SPRAYER N.O.I.B.N. AND A VAT.

Appellant's argument that the portion of the spray
dip classified by the trial court as "an enclosure or device for holding or restraining cattle while being sprayed
with D.D.T. or other new and modern insecticide" i.s a
vat rather than a spraying pen or chute ignores the
plain meaning of the words. As Appellant contends at
Page 11 of its Brief: "Neither of the parties can urge
t: strained or unnatural construction.'' Vat is defined
In Webster's New Internationa(D ictionary, supra, as:
1

'' 1. A large vessel, cistern, tub or barrel; e3p.,
such a large vessel for holding liquors in an imSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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mature state. 2. A measure of capacity. 3. A
liquor containing a dye which has been converted
by reduction into a soluble non-dyeing form. 4.
A salt pit."
Clearly, the large boxlike structure in which the animal
is confined while being sprayed is not a vat. The only
place where liquid is stored or held on the Spray-Dip
is in the storage tank on the side of the article above
its right wheel. See Plaintiff's Exhibits "A" and "B".
The court so found upon examining the exhibits and
viewing one of the articles in question. (Tr. 63). Mr.
William Abildgaard, the representative of the manufacturer of the machine also testified that that portion
of the article is to hold the animal, not to store liquids.
"Well, it has all of those different components
that any spraying machine has, plus instead of
having to hold the anmals or drive them up into
a corner some place and have them flouncing
around, you drive them into this machine, that is,
one at a time.'' (Tr. 54).
"It goes down through the floor into the drain
pit, picked up automaticlly by an injector, brought
up through a revolving strainer where all the
foreign matter is taken out, and drops back into
the tank and used over and over again.'' (Tr. 55).
'' Q.

Then this shown here at the top and shown
again in these two photographs, and on Exhibit B, .are including the space--"

"A. Yes."

'' Q. --To restrain or hold the

animal~''

''A. Yes, and to catch the chemical.''
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'' Q. That collects in the bottom 1''
''A. Yes."
'' Q. But the animal comes in one end, the doors
are shut, and it is restrained in there~''
"A. Yes." (Tr. 57).
'' Q. So the function of this piece on here is to
hold the animaH"
"A. To hold him and spray him." (Tr. 58).
It may be granted that the spray dip makes the old
method of putting cattle through a dipping vat obsolete
as is shown in Plaintiff's Exhibit "A" and as testified
by witness Abildgaard:

"Q. What particular portion in that does this
machine take, in the method of dipping~"
''A. Well, of course, this replaces the dipping
vat."
'' Q. What position in the method, the older method of dipping livestock, what position in
that method of dipping would this machine
take~"

"A.

Well, as I would understand it, that old
method of dipping livestock, this simply replaces it. That has become obsolete." (Tr. 60).

But the mere fact that the automobile made the horse
and buggy obsolete does not warrant calling the automobile a horse and buggy or the automobile motor a
lwrse.
Further, even if it be regarded as a vat or tank, the
same first-class rate would apply as applies under the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
tariff as interpreted by the trial court. See Items 41620,
51705, 41785 of Consolidated Freight Classification No.
17. (Exhibit "C").
C.

THE SPRAY-DIP IS NOT A "SPRAYER N.O.I.B.N."

Appellant contends that the spray-dip is a machine
and as such its parts are to be disregarded. It further
contends that the best decription of this machine is
"sprayers N.O.I.B.N." appearing in the Commodity
Tariff 260-A. N.O.I.B.N. means "not otherwise indexed
by name.'' Therefore, that description could apply only
if there were no description or combination of descriptions which more specifically describe the article.
Dar~ing

v. N.Y.C. and St. Louis R.R., 213 I.C.C.

418 (1935).
It was stipulated by counsel (Tr. 47-50) that Mr. L.
N. Brown, the tariff expert produced by Plaintiff would
have testified that in his opinion there is no commodity
rate for the article in Tariff ~60-A and that it is his
opinion that there is no specific description to cover
the article in Consolidated Freight Classification No.
17, but that the classification most closely applying to
this article is a combination of 16937 first appearing in
Supplement 8, Consolidated Freight Classification under
the heading "Farm, Dairy, Garden, Livestock, Orchard,
Poultry Equipment" as spraying pens or chutes, livestock, N.O.I.B.N., wood and steel combined, loose or in
packages, to which the first-class rate applies on L.C.L.
shipments and sprayers N.O.I.B.N. under Item 41017
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of Classification No. 17. No contrary evidence was presented by Defendant. There was adequate evidence to
support the finding of the court. In fact, none opposing
it. It is elementary that if there is sufficient evidence to
support the findings of the trial court, its findings are
conclusive.
Woolf v. Gray, supra.
The court found that a combination of "spraying
I)ens or chutes'' and ''sprayer'' was a more specific de·3cription of the Spray-Dip than merely "sprayer." The
combination rule provides:
''Rule 18. Combination Articles. When not specifically classified articles which have been combined or attached to each other will be charged
at the rating for the highest classified article
of the combination.'' Consolidated Freight Classification No. 17, Page 138. Ex. "C."
Therefore, the rate applicable to spraying pens or chutes,
which ia a first-class rate, would apply to the shipment
of Spray-Dips.
Other examples of the application of the combination rule are :
Day .and Night Water He·ater Co. v. Southern Bacific Co., 161 I.C.C. 45 (1920).
In that case an item known as a thermostatic valve was
shipped. This consisted of a brass valve and a thermoSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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stat, consisting of a carbon rod in a copper tube. As
installed in a water heater, the valve is inserted in the
gas feed pipe and the carbon and copper element in
the water space of the heater. With variations in temperature, it would increase or decrease the flow of gas
to the burner. The article was originally shipped and
billed as ''brass valves,'' there being no specific rate
for thermostatic valves. The Interstate Commerce Commission held that the item was a combination of a brass
valve and a thermostat and under the Combination Rule
would take the higher rate.

Spence v. Director-General, 87 I.C.C. 339 (1924).
In that case, gasoline engines with gears which could be
disconnected by means of a clutch were shipped. They
were billed and freight was collected originally under the
item of "engines N.O.I.B.N." The I. C. C. held that it
was a combination of a gasoline engine N.O.I.B.N. and
pumping powers and applied the higher rate under the
Combination Rule.

Humble Oil & Refinilng Co. v. Cisco and N. E. Railway, 186 I.C.C. 153 (1923).
In that case tool joints were attached to pipe. The I.C.C.
held that these were a combination article and applied
Rule 18.

Crancer v. Lowden, 121 Fed. 2d. 645; affirmed 315
U. S. 631, 86 Law Ed. 1077.
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In that case, used pipe was shipped. Some of the pipe
had protectors on the end to protect the thread. Some
of the pipe could be re-used and some could only be resmelted. The item was shipped as ''scrap iron, N.O.I.
B.N.'' classification. The court held that it was a combination of pipe, used pipe and pipe fittings and applied
the highest rate under the Combination Article Rule.
It is clear from the evidence that the Spray-Dip is
more than an ordinary sprayer, such as a housewife u.ses
on the ants, flies, rodents, or other insect pests, or such
as a farmer uses on fruit trees, similarly to destroy
in.sects. A "sprayer" is defined in Webster's New International Dictionary, supra, as ''any instrument, device or mechanism for spraying liquids.'' The SprayDip not only spray liquids on animal.s, but it collects
the excess liquid, filters it, stores it and u.ses it again,
and, at the same time, confines the animal and holds it
still while spraying it. As testified by Mr. Abildgaard:
"Well, it has all of tho.se different components that any spraying machine has, plus instead
of having to hold the animal or drive them up into
a corner some place and having them flouncing
around, you drive them into this machine, that is,
one at a time.'' (Tr. 54. Emphasis .supplied.)
''And this place of confinement is specially
designed to hold the animal in line for the spraying operation." (Tr. 59).
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An examination of the machine itself convinced the trial
court that there was more than a sprayer involved and
that it could be more specifically described as a sprayer
combined with a spraying pen or chute than as merely a
sprayer. The only items otherwise specified in CFC 17
are automatic animal sprayers, ( 16935) and boiler or
furnace sprayers (27550). It is inconceivable that the
same generic word ''sprayers'' that would include
''flit guns'' and garden sprayers would be considered
to describe more closely a Spray-Dip than the combination description of ''spraying pens and chutes'' and
''sprayer.'' The issue in

Tubbs v. Mechanics' Insurance Co., 131 Iowa 217, 108
N. W. 325.
tited by Appellant was whether "machinery of all kinds
and descriptions'' as used in an insurance policy was a
description broad enough to include a steam boiler and
pipe installed in a steam laundry, not whether there was
some term in the policy which more specifically described the boiler and pipes. Granted that the Spray-Dip
is a sprayer, but is it also more specifically described
in the tariff~ That is the issue here.
For example, a refrigerator is in a sense a machine
for cooling food, but it could be more specifically described than referring to it as a cooling machine by
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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calling it a combination of a cooling unit and an in·sulated storage box.
e.g. Norge Oorp. v. Long Island R. R., 220 I.C.C. 470.
WHEREFORE, Respondent submits that the trial
court did not err and that the decision below should be
a:ffirmed and Respondent be awarded its costs herein.
Respectfully submitted,
PET·ER W. BILLINGS,
FABIAN, CLENDENIN,
MOFFAT & MABEY

Attorneys for Respondent
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